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THUCYDIDES

INTRODUCTION

The hearsay doctrine has been characterized as 'that most characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence - a rule which
may be esteemed, next to jury trial, the greatest contribution of that
eminently practical legal system to the world's methods of procedure."'
Several rationales justify the general rule excluding hearsay. 2 By modem consensus, however, the principal justification for the exclusionary
rule is that hearsay testimony is suspect because it has not been
subjected to the test of cross-examination. 3 The common law regards
cross-examination as the "greatest legal engine... for the discovery
of truth."4 As hearsay testimony has not been tested by cross-examination, doubts arise about the trustworthiness of the testimony.
Cross-examination allows the opposing attorney to probe the testimony for latent deficiencies in the witness's perception, memory, narration, and sincerity.5 At common law, a person must possess four
testimonial qualities in order to be a competent witness: moral capacity
and the mental capacities to observe, remember, and describe. 6 The
common law competency standards are lax and disqualify persons as
witnesses only when the persons have very severe deficits in a testimonial quality. 7 However, even when the person is generally competent

EVIDENCE § 1364, at 28 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 245, at 726 (3d ed. 1984).

1. 5 J. WIGMORE,
2.

Id. § 245, at 728.
5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1367, at 32.
R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KiONKA,
EVIDENCE 467 (2d ed. 1986).
6. Id. at 122.
7. Id. at 127.
3.
4.
5.
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to serve as an in-court witness or hearsay declarant, one of the person's
testimonial abilities may be deficient. As Professor Morgan pointed
out, a hearsay declarant's perception, memory, narration, or sincerity
may be deficient. Those defects8 are the essential risks9 inherent in
uncross-examined hearsay testimony.
Although the general hearsay exclusionary rule exists both at common law and under the Federal Rules of Evidence ("Rules"),'0 courts
often admit hearsay testimony under certain exceptions to the rule.
Given the rationale for the rule, the existence and content of the
hearsay exceptions ought to be dictated by the relative importance of
the respective hearsay risks. If, for example, the primary risk is that
the declarant will deliberately lie, courts and legislatures should formulate exceptions that admit demonstrably sincere statements. When
the proponent can demonstrate the presence of a factor indicating the
hearsay declarant's subjective sincerity and minimizing the risk of
lying, the statement should be exceptionally admissible. Alternatively,
assuming that the foremost risk is a factor such as imperfect memory,
the exceptions should have an entirely different complexion; facts
suggesting the hearsay declarant's subjective sincerity may not necessarily remove doubts about the quality of the declarant's memory.
As the next section of this article notes, the common law long
assumed that the primary hearsay danger was the declarant's insincerity, and that the other hearsay risks such as imperfect memory were
of only secondary importance.", That assumption had a decisive impact
on the nature of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. The
common law courts traditionally recognized exceptions such as the
excited utterance doctrine based on facts suggesting the declarant's
truthfulness.1 In contrast, until Congress enacted the Federal Rules
of Evidence in the mid-1970s, 1 the courts balked at recognizing excep-

8.

Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L.

REV. 177, 200-04 (1948).

9.

Id. at 192.

FED. R. EvID. art. VIII.
11. See Bergman, Ambiguity: The Hidden Hearsay DangerAlmost Nobody Talks About,
75 Ky. L.J. 841 (1987).
12. The excited utterance exception is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2): 'The
following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness:... (2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." FED.
10.

R. EVID. 803.

13. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, §1, 88 Stat. 1926. The Federal Rules are in
effect in the federal court system and in 31 states. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E.
KIONKA, supra note 5, at 23-24.
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tions such as the present sense impression doctrine," which remove
doubt about the declarant's memory but fail to guarantee the declarant's subjective sincerity. Thus, the common law governing hearsay
exceptions reflected the premise that the danger of insincerity outweighed the other risks in admitting uncross-examined testimony.
Psychologists have successfully exposed that premise as erroneous.'5 Like Thucydides, modern researchers have found that deficiencies in the memory factor are a far more important cause of testimonial
error than subjective insincerity. 16 Based on that research, scientists
have criticized the hearsay doctrine under both the common law and
the Rules. 17 These critics argue that both the common law and the
Rules slight the importance of misrecollection in evaluating the reliability of hearsay testimony.
One of the two theses of this article is that the criticism of the
Rules is largely misplaced. This article attempts to establish that to
an extent not previously appreciated, Article VIII of the Rules mandates that the courts focus on the memory factor in assessing the
trustworthiness of hearsay testimony. This article argues that Congress partially learned the lesson psychologists have long attempted
to teach evidence scholars. However, the other thesis of this article
is that to date, courts construing the Rules have overlooked the congressional mandate. This article contends that in applying the Rules,
courts frequently have admitted hearsay testimony in the face of glaring doubts about the caliber of the declarant's memory. These courts
appear to have quickly forgotten the lesson Congress learned.
Part II of this article describes the common law hearsay doctrine.
That section demonstrates the common law obsession with sincerity
and the neglect of memory factors. Part III summarizes the
psychologists' critique of the common law. Part IV advances the first
thesis mentioned above. It argues that in large measure, Article VIII
of the Rules responds to the psychologists' critique of the common

14. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) sets out a version of the present sense impression
hearsay exception: '"The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness: (1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter." FED. R. EVID. 803.

15. See generally Stewart, Perception,Memory, and Hearsay:A Criticismof Present Law
and The ProposedFederal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1 (relating perception and
memory to admissibility of testimony under hearsay exceptions).
16. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
17. Stewart, supra note 15, at 8-22.
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law. This section canvasses and synthesizes the provisions of Article
VIII that reflect greater concern about the memory factor. It urges
that the statutory scheme of Article VIII demands that the courts
pay more attention to the memory factor than at common law. By
surveying the case law administering Article VIII, part V develops
the second thesis of this article. As a result of the survey, part V
concludes that in all too many cases, courts have ignored the memory
factor. This article calls upon the courts to recognize the mandate
implicit in Article VIII and to be more conscious of the memory factor
inthe future.
II.

THE COMMON LAW OBSESSION WITH SUBJECTIVE SINCERITY

The common law courts made a number of simplistic - and erroneous - assumptions about the relative importance of the sincerity and
memory factors. Those assumptions were extremely influential in shaping the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
A.

PsychologicalAssumptions About Sincerity and Memory

The common law courts generally refused to acknowledge that the
memory factor could pose serious hearsay dangers. 18 Common law
judges knew little of the psychopathology of memory.1 9 Instead, these
judges subscribed to a naive, rationalistic conception of cognitive functioning.2 ° They viewed the human memory as a passive photographic
recorder2l or mirror,2 which automatically registered original sense
impressions23 and could later, they believed, reproduce mechanicallyr
the original perception.23
In contrast, the courts presumed that insincerity, or deliberate
deception, was the major source of testimonial error.2 The hearsay

18. See Morgan, supra note 8, at 204-05 (citing as illustrative cases involving testator's
statements about allegedly revoked wills). The cases are collected in 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1725-31 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976); Morgan, supra note 8,at 205 n.62.
19. See Kubie, Implicationsfor Legal Procedureof the Fallibilityof Human Memory, 108
U. PA. L. REV. 59, 61 (1959).

20. Stewart, supranote 15, at 8.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to
Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1130 (1973).
23. See Kubie, supra note 19, at 61.
24. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 8.
25. But see Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 391,
401 (1933) ("Memory is more than the re-instatement of the original perception .....
26. Kubie, supra note 19.
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rule crystallized in England between 1675 and 1690.- In 1676, Parliament passed the original Statute of Frauds." In the preamble to the
Statute,2 Parliament voiced the widely held perception that there
were "many fraudulent practices, which [were] commonly endeavoured
to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury."3 0 Earlier English
statutes included preambles asserting that "perjury... horribly continues and daily increases in the kingdom."3' 1 Hence, the hearsay rule
emerged at a time when the courts and legislators assumed that perjury, the epitome of insincerity, was rampant.
B.

The Impact of PsychologicalAssumptions
on the Hearsay Exceptions

The common law courts reasoned quite logically from their assumptions about the relative importance of the hearsay dangers of sincerity
and memory. In their minds, insincerity was the major danger to be
guarded against. Consequently, in deciding whether to recognize a
hearsay exception, the courts stressed the question of whether the
foundation included a guarantee of the declarant's subjective sincerity.'* When the circumstances created an inference that the declarant
probably was speaking sincerely,3 the primary danger was
minimized;H the court could admit the hearsay declaration without
offending the policy inspiring the hearsay rule.
That line of reasoning rationalized such hearsay exceptions as the
dying declarations and excited utterance3 6 doctrines. The courts understandably held that sincere statements such as excited utterances need

27. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 244, at 725.
28. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 13 Car. 2, ch. 3 (1676) (effective June
20, 1677) (quoted in part in E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.1, at 370 (1982)).
29. Id. (quoted in G. GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 265, at 435
n.4 (J. Murray ed. 1965)).
30. Id.
31. E.g., 38 Edw. 3, ch. 12 (1363); 34 Edw. 3, ch. 8 (1360); 5 Edw. 3, ch. 10 (1331) (cited
in R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 5, at 551).
32. Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REv. 271, 280, 286 (1952); Morgan, supra
note 8, at 203.
33. Ladd, supra note 32, at 280.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 281.
36. Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IOWA L. REV. 224,243 (1961).
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not be contemporaneous with the events the declarants described.37
To be sure, the lack of contemporaneity raised concerns about the
caliber of the declarant's memory; but those concerns struck the courts
as too insubstantial to justify excluding the statements. So long as
declarants spoke in the throes of startling events dictating their
thought processes,3 a circumstantial inference of subjective truthfulness arose. According to the conventional wisdom, that inference practically eliminated the principal hearsay danger of insincerity and warranted admitting the testimony.
The courts' decision to recognize hearsay exceptions for evidently
sincere statements such as excited utterances was only one effect of
the judicial assumptions about the relative importance of sincerity and
memory. The same assumptions also explained the courts' refusal to
adopt proposed exceptions such as the present sense impression doctrine. The proponents of that doctrine urged that a hearsay declarant's
calm, contemporaneous statements about an event should be exceptionally admissible.3 9 The proponents contended that the contemporaneous
nature of the statements virtually eliminated any doubt about the
declarant's memory. 40 In the minds of most common law courts, however, that contention missed the mark. The leading hearsay danger
was insincerity, and the contemporaneity of the statement did not
ensure the declarant's subjective sincerity. A long line of English 4'
and American42 decisions rejected the proposed exception. The over-

37. Slough, Res Gestae, 2 U. KAN L. REV. 246, 256-57 (1954) (citing Vicksburg & Merridian
R.R. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99 (1908); Britton v. Washington Water Power Co., 59 Wash. 440,
110 P. 20 (1910)); Comment, Excited Utterances and Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions
to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 661, 667-68 (1969).
38. Slough, supra note 36, at 243.
39. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins
and Attributes, 66 IowA L. REV. 869, 875 (1981).
40. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 6, 161 S.W.2d 474, 477 (1942) ("safe from
any error from defect of memory of the declarant").
41. Thayer, Bedingfield's Case - Declarationsas a Part of Res Gestae, 15 AM. L. REV.
1 (1881). The article analyzes the English decisional law culminating in the famous Bedingfield's
decision. 14 Cox's Crim. Cas. 341 (Crown Ct. 1879).
42. Wrage v. King, 114 Kan. 539,220 P. 259 (1923) is one of the leading American authorities.
In Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REV. 91, 98 (1937), the author notes the 'trend toward
unanimity in requiring the startling occurrence." However, Morgan also cautions that "[t]his is
not to say that there is such great harmony in its application." Id. (citing Greener v. General
Electric Co., 209 N.Y. 135, 102 N.E. 527 (1913); People v. Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 85 N.E.
690 (1908)).
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whelming majority of courts3 insisted upon proof of a startling event
as the threshold condition for admissibility."
This nearly unanimous 45 insistence on proof of a startling event
was particularly remarkable in light of the scholarly support for the
present sense impression exception. One of the giants of nineteenth
century evidence law, Thayer, championed the exception. 41 In this

century, the great evidence reformer, Morgan, took up the cause of

the doctrine. 47 The drafters of both the Model Code of Evidence and
the Uniform Rules of Evidence 49 included a version of the present
sense impression exception in their drafts. However, until Congress
incorporated the exception in Article VIII of the Rules, the proposed
exception languished. °
III.

THE PSYCHOLOGISTS' CRITIQUE OF THE COMMON LAW
OBSESSION WITH SUBJECTIVE SINCERITY

Although the common law judges steadfastly adhered to their as-

sumptions about the memory and sincerity factors, legal psychologists
were highly critical of those assumptions.51 They developed an extensive body of literature on the subject, 52 including the classic 1928
article, "Some Observations on the Law of Evidence" by Hutchins

43. See Morgan, supra note 42, at 98; see also Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations
on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 432 (1928) (noting most courts require a
startling event); Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity and the Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal
of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204, 206 (1960); Comment, The Present Sense Impression
Exception to the HearsayRule: Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), 81 DICK. L. REV. 347, 351
(1977) (citing Wigmore's influence on courts requiring a startling event).
44. Quick, supra note 43, at 206-07 n.12 (citing Rainesco v. Grant Finishing Co., 133 N.J.L.
611, 45 A.2d 678 (1946)).
45. Morgan, supra note 42, at 98.
46. See Thayer, supra note 41, at 11-20.
47. Morgan, supra note 42, at 91; see Waltz, supra note 39, at 875 (citing Morgan, A
Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestue, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 236-37

(1922)).
48. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rules 512(a)-(b) (1942).
49. UNip. R. EVID. 63(4)(a)-(b).
50. Waltz, supra note 39, at 875.
51. See, e.g., Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1088.
52. See id. at 1088-89; Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Research and Legal
Thought, in CRIME AND JuSTicE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 105, 144-51 (M. Tonry
& N. Morris, eds. 1981) (an eight-page list of references on the general topic); Monahan &
Loftus, The Psychology of Law, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 441, 468-75 (1982) (another extensive list of references on the topic).
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and Slesinger.6 After conducting numerous experiments54 and amassing substantial empirical evidence5 about the memory and sincerity
factors, the legal psychologists concluded that the common law courts'
assumptions about the factors were superficial and flawed.5 In turn,
based on that conclusion, the psychologists questioned the soundness
of the law governing hearsay exceptions.6
A.

The Sincerity Factor

As the last section demonstrated, the common law courts assumed
that insincerity was a major, if not the major, cause of testimonial
error. The legal psychologists concluded that this assumption was
invalid,5 and began attacking it shortly after the turn of the century. 59
Convinced that most testimonial errors were unintentional,60 they
charged that the courts' concern with deliberate falsification was excessive.1 "[Wiitnesses are more often . . . mistaken than committing
perjury."' 2 The available empirical data indicated that perjury was
relatively rare.2 As a result, insincerity appeared to play a minor role
in causing testimonial error.64
Moreover, psychological research demonstrated that in many cases,
the emotions that seemingly ensured sincerity tended to distort the
observer's perception and memory. 65 The common law facilely equated
subjective sincerity and objective accuracy.6 Legal psychologists
pointed out that although emotional stress sometimes produced sincerity, stress also could lead to error and distortion. 67 Thus, emotionally

53. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 437.
Stewart, supra note 15, at 8.
See, e.g., Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1080.
See, e.g., Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43, at 437.
E.g., Kubie, supra note 19, at 59.
Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1088. One of the seminal works was H. MIONSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908). Id. at 1089.
60. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 25, at 391; Kubie, supra note 19, at 66; Stewart, supra
note 15, at 9.
61. Stewart, supra note 15, at 8-9.
62. Ladd, supra note 32, at 286.
63. Kubie, supra note 19, at 59; Morgan, supra note 8, at 186.
64. Kubie, supra note 19, at 59.
65. Morgan, supra note 42, at 98.
66. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43, at 439.
67. Stewart, supra note 15, at 8, 28.
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excited statements could contain a significant degree of error.6 Rather
than validating an equation between sincerity and accuracy, the empirical research suggested an inverse relationship between the declarant's
excitement level and the declaration's objective accuracy. 69 Excited

declarants lose at least as much in accurate perception and memory
as they gain in sincerity. 7°
B.

The Memory Factor

Although legal psychologists have not reached consensus on every
aspect of human memory, 7 1 most agree it is a much more subtle, 72
error-prone
process than the common law judges assumed.

Psychologists found that testimonial error only rarely was caused by
insincerity,74 but frequently was traceable to defective memory. One

authority declared that memory was "one of man's most fallible...
instruments.'75 After summarizing the research, another authority asserted that honest errors in mental capacities such as memory were
"the most important source of testimonial conflict." 76
Psychologists also recognized the complexity of memory. 77 According to the common law conception, memory consisted of simple acts78

of initially registering79 and later reproducingso sensory perceptions.
In sharp contrast, psychologists concluded that numerous factors affect
the accuracy and retention of memory.8 ' Some factors operate at the

68. Id. at 19.
69. Quick, supra note 43, at 210; see also Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1093 (citing
research showing stress decreases accuracy of recall); Morgan, supra note 42, at 96 (citing
research by Hutchins and Slesinger demonstrating diminished accuracy of perception with increased excitement).
70. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43, at 439; Note, The PresentSense Impression, 56
TEx. L. REV. 1053, 1057 (1978).
71. See Gardner, supra note 25, at 391 (mentioning the differing views of objectivists,
imagists, and Gestaltists); see also Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1099 (describing three
psychological conceptions of the memory function).
72. See Kubie, supra note 19, at 61-64.
73. Id. at 60-61.
74. Id. at 59.
75. Id. at 60; see also Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1130 ("the dangers from fallible
sense perception and memory.., are overwhelming").
76. Stewart, supra note 15, at 9.
77. Kubie, supra note 19, at 61.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1105.
81. Stewart, supra note 15, at 38.
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time of the original perception, others come into play when the person
attempts to remember the original perception, and still others are
influential in the interim between original perception and the attempted recollection.
Several factors operating at the time of the original perception can
affect the accuracy of the later recollection. One factor is the nature
of the event or fact observed; the simpler the observation, the easier
for the observer to retain the information in memory.A2 The risk of
misrecollection increases as the information becomes more complex.
Another consideration is the observer's attentiveness.23 An observer
who concentrates4 intenselys is more likely to fixate details in memory.6 A ready,87 interesteds observer can more easily impress the
perceived sensory data upon memory. Another consideration operating at the time of perception is the emotional association of the perceived data. Generally, observers can best remember 9' data that has
positive emotional significance for them. 91 Most persons remember
pleasant information with acuity. 92 Conversely, they quickly forget
data with unpleasant associations9 The latter describes the phenomenon of repression. 94 Traumatic events 95 commonly generate the type
of negative associations that trigger repression.
Other factors operate later when the observer attempts to remember the earlier perceptions. These factors include the type of
information the person is trying to recall, the person's caution, and
any suggestive influences on the person. To begin with, people ordi-

82. United States v. Howard, 774 F.2d 838, 84546 (7th Cir. 1985); Allen, A Report on the
Status of the Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 30 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 265, 281 n.78

(1986).
83. Stewart, supra note 15, at 22.
84. Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1097.
85. Gardner, supra note 25, at 394.
86. Id. at 394-95.
87. Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1097.
88. Stewart, supra note 15, at 22.
89. Morgan, supra note 8, at 188.
90. Gardner, supra note 25, at 396.
91. Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1104.
92. Kubie, supra note 19, at 63.
93. Id.; Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1100.
94. See Kubie, supranote 19, at 68 ('The great Charles Darwin wrote that he had discovered
that if he did not write down the observations which argued against his theories he always
forgot them."); Stewart, supra note 15, at 19.
95. Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1100.
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narily can remember visual perceptions (recognition memory) more
easily than they can verbal descriptions (recall memory).9 Further,
recollection usually is superior when the person consciously exercises
caution in attempting to remember the informationY Administering

an oath to the person can induce caution.9 Additionally, external influences impact the quality of memory. Social psychology 99 has demonstrated that people are susceptible to suggestive influence. 10 If a third
party interrogates the person about the earlier event, the form of the

question'01 can supply cues 02 to the person answering it. The phrasing
of the question might imply facts or suggest the questioner's expecta-

tions. l°s The suggestion can be especially powerful when the questioner
is an authority figure. 10 4 A strong suggestion can "literally 'devastate[]

memory.'

'105

Finally, several relevant factors come into play between the original
perception and the attempted recollection. The common law assumed
that human memory was a passive recording mechanism0 6 that regis-

tered' 07 a permanent image of a perceived event. Contemporary
psychology paints a radically different picture of memory as an active, 1 8 constructiveo" process. The memory process involves ongoing"0
subconscious' activity in which memories of similar experiences 2
tend to fuse and blend."' The tendency is particularly marked when

96. Id. at 1086, 1095, 1101; Stewart, supra note 15, at 19.
97. Stewart, supra note 15, at 14-15.
98. Id. at 22.
99. Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1087, 1103.
100. Id. at 1087; see Gardner, supra note 25, at 402; Stewart, supra note 15, at 12, 18.
101. Stewart, supra note 15, at 13; Gardner, supra note 25, at 403, 405.
102. Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1118.
103. Id. at 1093.
104. Id. at 1113.
105. Gardner, supranote 25, at 402 (quoting H. MONSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND
67 (1908)).
106. Stewart, supra note 15, at 9.
107. Kubie, supra note 19, at 61-64.
108. Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1099.
109. Id. at 1104; see Georges, Don't Forget, Says Author: Memory Is a Creative Process,
59 WASHINGTON 2 (1989) ("Memory is a creative process .... It is a product of desire,
attention, [and] insight .... We do not retrieve memories but rather create them anew each
time we remember.").
110. Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1099.
111. Id.
112. Kubie, supra note 19, at 65, 68.
113. Stewart, supra note 15, at 17.
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past experiences are associated with emotional prejudice.14 Bias distorts memory, as people tend to remember what they wish had occurred or what they think should have occurred."1 5 When the original
perception is incomplete, bias frequently supplies the missing details

later. 16
While the inventive 117 process of memory often alters", details, the
time between the original perception and the attempted recollection
can eclipse details. Numerous experiments have demonstrated the
alarmingly fast rate at which people forget." 9 In one study involving
memory of syllables, within one day the subjects forgot an average
of sixty-six percent of the information they had attempted to
memorize. 2 0 In another study testing recollection of words, the typical
subject forgot ninety percent of the information within a week. 21 By
the time weeks have passed,ns memory decaym is extensive; the average person will have forgotten a large part of the originally perceived
data. 12A
Given the state of the research on sincerity and memory, legal
psychologists were predictably unhappy with the state of the law
governing hearsay exceptions. The controlling evidence law generally
has been oblivious to the psychological findings on sincerity and memory.25 The Hutchins and Slesinger article epitomizes psychologists'
dissatisfaction with the current state of the law. By challenging the
excited utterance exception,2 6 the authors spoke for many
psychologists who condemned these statements as "[t]he most unreliable type of evidence admitted under hearsay exceptions."'' In their
next breath, the authors praised the present sense impression excep-

114.

Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1107.

115.

Gardner, supra note 25, at 400, 405-06.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 400-01.
Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1094.
Id. at 1092 (construing Gardner, supra note 25, at 409).
See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 25, at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 394; Stewart, supra note 15, at 13.
Stewart, supra note 15, at 16; Levine & Tapp, supra note 22, at 1100.

124.

Gardner, supra note 25, at 394.

125.

Stewart, supra note 15, at 24.

126. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43, at 437.
127. Stewart, supranote 15, at 28; see also 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE
803(2)[01], at 803-86 (1988) (describing commentators' criticisms of the excited

utterance exception).
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tion that most courts rejected.ms Stressing that the present sense
impression doctrine eliminated most doubts about the declarant's memory, m they described present sense impressions as "the best evidence
of all." 11 Hutchins and Slesinger's position on the present sense impression doctrine voiced the sentiments of many who regarded present
sense impressions as a superior type of hearsay evidence.131

IV.

THE RESPONSE OF THE RULES TO THE PSYCHOLOGISTS'
CRITIQUE: THE LESSON LEARNT

The last two sections of this article demonstrate that the common
law governing hearsay exceptions rested on erroneous assumptions
about the sincerity and memory factors. The debate over the Rules
gave the drafters an opportunity to correct those errors and reform
the law accordingly. Most commentators, however, have dismissed
the "new" Rules as basically codifying the traditional approach to the
hearsay doctrine.t 2 More specifically, they have concluded that Article
VIII of the Rules, dealing with the hearsay doctrine, leaves intact
the common law misconceptions about the memory and sincerity factors. "3

In some respects, that conclusion is correct. Some aspects of Article
VIII preserve the common law stress on sincerity.'1 On closer

128. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43, at 439-40; see Note, Spontaneous Exclamations
in the Absence of a Startling Event, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 430, 431 (1946).
129. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43, at 43940.
130. Id. at 439.
131. E.g., Comment, supra note 37, at 677; Comment, The Present Sense Impression
HearsayException: An Analysis of the Contemporaneity and CorroborationRequirements, 71
Nw. U.L. REv. 666, 668 (1977).
132. See generally Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 51, 53 (1987) (Federal Rules of Evidence emerged from Congress with most of the traditional limitations on hearsay intact).

133. See Stewart, supra note 15.
134. Id. at 37. One of the controversial issues in hearsay is whether the definition of hearsay
should include so-called "Morgan hearsay." Wright v. Tatham, 7 Ad. & El. 313, 112 Eng. Rep.
488, 490 (Ex. 1837), is the classic illustration, excerpted in almost all evidence casebooks. See,
e.g., R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 5, at 469-71. In that case,

the issue was whether the decedent was competent to execute a will. Wright, 7 Ad. & El. at
313, 112 Eng. Rep. at 489. The proponent of the will offered testimony that the decedent's
acquaintances had written serious letters to him. Id. at 314-15, 112 Eng. Rep. at 489. The
acquaintances' willingness to write serious letters to the decedent was circumstantially relevant
to show their belief in his competence. Id. at 317, 112 Eng. Rep. at 490. In turn, the proponent
offered the testimony to show the truth of the belief, arguing that if the writers were the
decedent's acquaintances and knew him fairly well, their belief was some evidence of the dece-
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scrutiny, however, Article VIII emphasizes the memory factor far
more than the common law did. Many of the decisions of the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee and Congress are explicable primarily in
terms of the memory factor. The picture that emerges from an analysis
of the statutory framework of Article VIII is that the article directs
courts to increase their appreciation of the memory factor.
One inkling of the new stress on memory surfaces in the Advisory
Committee Notes, the commentary prepared by the committee which
helped draft the Rules.13 Significantly, the notes to Article VIII rely
on several of the leading authorities calling for greater stress on the
memory factor. The very first authority cited in the note to Article
VIII is an article by Professor Morgan, challenging the common law
overemphasis on sincerity. 136 Later, the committee approvingly cites
the Hutchins and Slesinger article decrying the common law neglect
of the memory factor. 137 These citations indicate that the committee
empathized with those who criticized the common law assumptions
about sincerity and memory. More importantly, Article VIII shows
that the drafters translated their empathy into textual language mandating a more careful evaluation of the memory factor in hearsay
testimony. The text of Article VIII reflects a realization that memory
failure is a widespread problem and that the caliber of memory should
weigh heavily in deciding whether to admit hearsay.
A.

The Widespread Problem of Memory Failure

Article VIII recognizes two types of hearsay exceptions. Some
exceptions, set out in Rule 803, do not require foundational proof of
the declarant's unavailability at the time of trial. 1 s On the other hand,

dent's competence. Id. at 322, 112 Eng. Rep. at 492-93. In Wright, the English court ruled that
the testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 384, 112 Eng. Rep. at 515.
Some modern commentators, including Professor Morgan, have supported that ruling. E.g.,
Morgan, supra note 8, at 214, 217. Professor Morgan argued that there is a need to question
the out-of-court actor about the perception or memory inspiring the belief. Id. at 217. However,
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence decided to exclude Morgan hearsay from the
hearsay definition in Federal Rule 801(a). In justifying their decision, the drafters reasoned
that "[the situations giving rise to the nonverbal conduct are such as virtually to eliminate
questions of sincerity." FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note.
135. Cleary, PreliminaryNotes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908,
913 (1978).
136. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's note (citing Morgan, supra note 8, at
177, 214, 217).
137. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee's note (citing Hutchins & Slesinger, supra
note 43, at 432).
138.

FED. R. EVID. 803.
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all exceptions recognized in Rule 804 demand a showing of the declarant's unavailability. 139 Rule 804(a)(3) provides that the definition encompasses situations in which 'the declarant . testifies to a lack
14 0
of memory on the subject matter of the declarant's statement. 4
The inclusion of this provision in Rule 804 is revealing. The Advisory Committee acknowledged the existing contrary authority at common law. 141 A large body of case law held that the witness's purported
lack of memory was an insufficient showing of unavailability.14 One
of the leading rationales for this holding was the fear that treating
memory failure as a species of unavailability "would open the door to
a perjured claim of forgetfulness."' In light of the common law
psychological assumptions, that fear was both understandable and logical. If memory is a simple, mechanical process, memory failure should
be rare. When a witness claims memory failure, that claim should be
automatically suspect; specifically, the sincerity of the claim should be
deemed questionable. Again, the common law operated on the assumptions that insincerity was the primary hearsay danger and that defective memory was merely a secondary risk. On those assumptions, a
general rule rejecting memory failure as an adequate showing of unavailability is defensible.
Nonetheless, the drafters of Rule 804(a)(3) consciously repudiated
that rule. This repudiation strongly suggests that they also rejected
the underlying assumptions supporting that rule. The treatment of
memory failure as an acceptable type of unavailability implies that
the drafters believed that the problem of defective memory was more
widespread than the common law courts assumed. Because defective
memory remains a more pervasive problem, courts need not treat
purported memory failure as automatically suspect. Both the Morgan
and Hutchins and Slesinger articles point out that misrecollection is
a common problem. Coupled with the drafters' citation to those articles, Rule 804(a)(3) evidences a realization that the quality of memory
is a pervasive factor affecting the reliability of hearsay testimony.

139.

FED. R. EVID. 804.

140.
141.

FED.

R. EVID. 804(a)(3).
FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3) advisory committee's note.

142. See, e.g., Rio Grande Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 55 Colo. 493, 136 P. 68 (1914); A.T.
Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 239 Mass. 59, 131 N.E. 217 (1921); see also C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 234, at 494-95 (1954) (discussing failure of memory
as grounds for unavailability).
143. Id. § 234, at 494.
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B. Ensuring the Quality of the Hearsay Declarant'sMemory
Realizing that the memory factor often affects the trustworthiness
of hearsay testimony is one thing. Deciding as a matter of policy to
assign great weight to that factor is quite another matter. However,
a careful reading of Article VIII reveals that the Advisory Committee
and Congress reached that very decision. For instance, Rules 803(1)
and (3) indicate that the presence of facts ensuring the quality of the
declarant's memory weighs strongly in favor of admitting the declarant's hearsay statement.
1. Rule 803(1): The Present Sense Impression
As previously stated, at common law only a minority ofjurisdictions
embraced the present sense impression exception admitting contemporaneous, unexcited statements.'" However, the Advisory Committee proposed recognizing the exception. The proposal faced determined
opposition during the congressional hearings on the Rules. During the
House hearings, both the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(A.T.L.A.)145 and the American Bar Association (A.B.A.)146 opposed
the Committee's draft of Rule 803(1). The opponents stressed that at
common law, the exception was a distinct minority view.147 In light
of the state of the case law and the formidable opposition, Congress's
decision to approve the Committee's draft of Rule 803(1) was a "novel,
even radical, departure from conventional wisdom."1
Surely, the stated justifications for such a radical, considered decision are entitled to a good deal of weight in interpreting the overall
scheme of Article VIII. To justify the decision, the Advisory Committee invoked both Morgan's writings and the Hutchins and Slesinger
article in the note to Rule 803(1).14 The note argues the merits of
recognizing the present sense impression exception by pointing to the

144. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 127, 803(1)[01], at 803-71 ("barely..
* acknowledged by the courts"); Comment, supra note 37, at 678.
145. Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
212-14 (1973) [hereinafter House Hearings) (position paper submitted by James F. Schaeffer
and Professor Joe A. Moore).
146. Id. at 116, 119-20 (letter from Robert W. Meserve); id. at 337, 340 (letter from Kenneth
J. Burns, Jr.).
147. Id. at 212-14 (position paper submitted by James F. Schaeffer and Professor Joe A.
Moore).
148. Waltz, supra note 39, at 869.
149. FED. R. EvID. 803(1) advisory committee's note.
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"substantial contemporaneity of event and statement."1w During the
Senate hearings on the proposed rules, Richard Keatinge, the chair
of the California Law Revision Commission, spoke in favor of Rule
803(1). 151 The initial argument Mr. Keatinge advanced was that contemporaneous statements are "safe from any error from defect of memory
of the declarant. 152 These arguments evidently persuaded Congress,
since it adopted them resoundingly by approving the present sense
impression doctrine as the very first hearsay exception enumerated
in Article VIII.
2. Rule 803(3): Statements of Present Bodily Condition
Congress liberalized the admissibility of hearsay testimony by approving the new present sense impression exception in Rule 803(1).
Similarly, Congress enlarged the admissibility of hearsay by broadening the scope of the existing exception for statements of present bodily
condition, codified in Rule 803(3). 15 Although most common law jurisdictions recognized this exception,'r they sharply limited its scope.
On the one hand, they admitted statements of present bodily condition
made by a declarant to a layperson'- or treating physician. 6 On the
other hand, many jurisdictions drew the line at statements made to
physicians consulted for purposes of trial preparation. 157 They did so
out of concern for the sincerity factor, fearing that "if the declarant
anticipates that enhancement of his symptoms will inure to his benefit
in the subsequent litigation, there is . . . an affirmative motive to
falsify or at least exaggerate."'
Just as Congress deviated from conventional wisdom by sanctioning
the present sense impression exception, it also broke with tradition

150.

Id.

151. Rules of Evidence: Hearingson H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 127, 163 (1974) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony of Richard H.
Keatinge).
152. Id. (quoting C. MCCORMICK, supra note 142, § 272, at 579).
153. In pertinent part, Rule 803(3) reads: "The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . . (3) . . . A statement of the

declarant's then existing... sensation...
bodily health).

. .

."

or physical condition (such as.. .pain... and

FED. R. EvID. 803.

154. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 291-92, at 838-41.
155. Id. § 291, at 838.
156. Id. § 292, at 839-41.
157. Id. § 293, at 841; Slough, supra note 36, at 225-26.
158.

C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 293, at 841.
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by enlarging the exception for declarations of present bodily condition.
On its face, Rule 803(3) applies to all statements of "then existing...
physical condition." 159 That language sweeps away the common law
limitation excluding statements made to experts consulted for trial
preparation purposes.
The reasoning supporting the expansive wording of Rule 803(3) is
pertinent here. In its note to the Rule, the Advisory Committee aptly
describes Rule 803(3) as "essentially a specialized application of Exception (1),"' 1 the present sense impression doctrine. A present sense
impression declaration is a contemporaneous statement about an external reality, an event the declarant is then perceiving. In the same
vein, a present bodily condition declaration is a contemporaneous statement about an internal reality, a sensation the declarant is then experiencing. Richard Keatinge reiterated that point during his Senate
testimony. 16 In adopting the expanded version of the exception for
bodily condition declarations, Congress necessarily discounted the
probative danger of insincerity, which had prompted many common
law courts to narrow the exception. Rather, Congress relied on the
contemporaneity of the statement and the consequent assurance of
the quality of the hearsay declarant's memory.'6 Although the conservative common law courts excluaed statements made to trial consultants on the premise that the danger of insincerity outweighed the
guarantee of the declarant's memory, Congress evidently decided to
admit the same evidence on the theory that the memory guarantee
was entitled to more weight.
C.

Challenging the Quality of the Declarant'sMemory

As noted earlier, 163 the common law courts placed a dual stress on
the sincerity factor. Not only would they recognize hearsay exceptions
based on foundations including proof of the declarant's subjective sincerity; they also hesitated to admit hearsay testimony absent a convincing inference of the declarant's sincerity. The Rules reflect a parallel

159. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
160. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note.
161. Senate Hearings, supra note 151, at 127, 164 (testimony of Richard Keatinge).
162. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 127, 803(3)[01], at 803-105; see also
Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J.
229, 236 (1922) (spontaneity and contemporaneity of statements accompanying nonverbal acts
render such statements credible).
163. See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
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stress on the memory factor. This section already has demonstrated
that in Rules 803(1) and (3), Congress treated contemporaneity, an
assurance of the declarant's memory, as a factor weighing heavily in
favor of admissibility. Congress's handling of Rules 803(2), 803(5), and
the proposed rule for statements of recent perception, shows that
Congress viewed a lack of contemporaneity as a factor cutting sharply
against admissibility.
1. Rule 803(2): The Excited Utterance
At common law, courts disagreed about the scope of the excited
utterance hearsay exception. 164 The prevailing view was that the excited statement must relate to the startling event inspiring the excitement. 1' However, a minority view expanded the exception to encompass related statements.61 The leading cases espousing the minority
view were District of Columbia decisions. 167
The Advisory Committee was aware of the minority view and even
cited some of the District of Columbia authorities in its note to Rule
803(2).6 8 Nevertheless, the Committee decided to follow the majority
view imposing the restriction. That decision is another indication of a
concern with the memory factor. Courts favoring the minority view
stressed the sincerity factor; they argued "that the declarant's nervous
excitement induces a truth telling state of mind ensuring the sincerity
of the declarant's statements, whether or not the statements relate
directly to the event.169 The majority view, however, attaches greater

weight to the memory factor. 70 By excluding statements about events
and facts preceding the startling event, the traditional restriction affords greater assurance of the caliber of the declarant's memory. The

C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 297, at 857-58.
165. Id. n.26 (citing Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293, 72 P.2d 425 (1937); Cook v. Hall, 308
Ky. 500, 214 S.W.2d 1017 (1948); State v. Walton, 432 A.2d 1275 (Me. 1981); Bagwell v. McLellan
Stores Co., 216 S.C. 207, 57 S.E.2d 257 (1949)).
166. Id. (citing Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); Felder v. Pinckney, 244 A.2d 481 (D.C. 1969); Sawyer v. Miseli,
156 A.2d 141 (D.C. 1959)).
167. See id.
168. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee's note (citing Murphy Auto Parts Co.,
249 F.2d at 508; Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Snead, 90 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
164.

703 (1937)).

169. R. CARLSON, R. IMWINKELRIED & E.

KIONKA,

supra note 5, at 503 (citing Murphy

Auto Parts Co., 249 F.2d at 508; Felder, 244 A.2d at 481; Sawyer, 156 A.2d at 141)).
170. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss2/1

20

Imwinkelried: Importance of the Memory: Factor in Analyzing the Reliability of
RELIABILITY OF HEARSAY TESTIMONY

Advisory Committee took the position that eliminating the restriction
would raise intolerable doubts about the reliability of the hearsay, and
Congress apparently concurred in that judgment.
2. Rule 803(5): The Past Recollection Recorded
Like the excited utterance doctrine, the past recollection recorded
exception was well-recognized at common law.171 Again, like the excited utterance doctrine, the past recollection recorded exception is
codified in the Rules. Rule 803(5) prescribes the foundational requirements for the exception. 172 The parallel continues because, like the
handling of the excited utterance exception, the treatment of this
exception by the Advisory Committee signals a new stress on the
memory factor.
The common law version of the past recollection recorded exception
required that the record in question be prepared at or near the time
of the event.Ir7 In Rule 803(5), the Advisory Committee phrased the
test differently, couching the test expressly in terms of the quality of
the declarant's memory 1 4 The wording of the Rule requires that the
proponent prove the declarant made the statement "when the matter

171. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 299, at 864-65 (citing United States v. Sawyer, 607
F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980); United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d
2,53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978); United States v. Williams, 571 F.2d 344 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978); Acklen's Executor v. Hickman, 63 Ala. 494 (1879);
Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz. 201, 65 P.2d 1141 (1937); State v. Easter, 185 Iowa 476, 170 N.W.
748 (1919); Mathis v. Strickland, 201 Kan. 655, 443 P.2d 673 (1968); State v. Legg, 59 W. Va.
315, 53 S.E. 545 (1906)).
172. Federal Rule 803(5) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: . . . (5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record
concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the
witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit
unless offered by an adverse party.
FED. R. EvID. 803.
173. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 127, 803(5)[01], at 803-163 to -164; see
also United States v. Patterson, 678 F.2d 774, 778-79 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A traditional rule,
commonly applied before adoption of Rule 803(5), was that freshness is defined by contemporaneousness, i.e., the witness' recollection must have been recorded at or near the time of the
event."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 911 (1982).
174. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5) advisory committee's note; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & 1vi. BERGER,
supra note 127, 803(5)[01], at 803-163 to -164.
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was fresh in the witness' memory

... ."175 The Rule thus directs the
courts administering Rule 803(5) to focus squarely on the memory
factor in deciding whether proffered hearsay testimony is trustworthy
enough to be admitted as past recollection recorded.
3. The Proposed Exception for Statements of Recent Perception
When the Advisory Committee drafted Rule 804, it included a
separate exception for statements of recent perception. 176 The proposed
exception read:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness: ... A statement, not
in response to the instigation of a person engaged in investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition recently perceived
by the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation
of pending or anticipated litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollection was clear.177
In several respects, the proposed exception was strikingly similar to
the present sense impression doctrine. To begin with, like the present
sense exception, the proposed exception was a distinct minority view
when the Advisory Committee began its work. In the note accompanying the proposed exception, the Committee analogized to a handful of
state statutes allowing the introduction of hearsay that was barred at
common law.1 8 In addition, during the congressional hearings on the
Rules, the proposal suffered the same fate as the present sense impression exception. The A.B.A. 7 9 and A.T.L.A., 18 the same groups that
inveighed against the present sense impression doctrine, pointedly
attacked the recent perception doctrine as well.", The A.T.L.A. urged
the defeat of both proposed exceptions to the hearsay rule, but seemed
more strongly opposed to the present sense impression doctrine.,?

175.
176.
TRATES
177.

FED. R. EviD. 803(5).
See FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGIS254-55 (1989).
Id.

178. Id.
179. See House Hearings, supra note 145, at 337, 341 (letter of Kenneth J. Burns, Jr.).
180. Id. at 212-14 (position paper submitted by Mr. James F. Schaeffer and Professor Joe
A. Moore).
181. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
182. See House Hearings, supra note 145, at 213. On behalf of the A.T.L.A., Mr. Schaeffer
and Professor Moore asserted in their position paper:
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At first blush, because so many commonalities existed between
the present sense impression and recent perception doctrines, it
perhaps should have been expected that Congress would either reject
or accept both exceptions. Indeed, because the A.T.L.A. appeared
more vehemently opposed to the present sense impression doctrine,
the recent perception exception arguably had a better prospect for
acceptance. Yet Congress did the seemingly unexpected: It chose to
treat the two exceptions differently by accepting the present sense
impression doctrine while jettisoning the recent perception proposal. 1'
That choice further indicates the importance that Congress assigned to the memory factor. Congress chose to admit statements of
immediate perception but to exclude statements of recent perception. '84
Although the two types of hearsay statements share many characteristics, they are distinguishable in terms of the magnitude of the risk of
defective memory. 54 Courts tend to confine the present sense impression exception to statements made seconds,'6 minutes,'n or at most
an hour or soi 's after the event observed. The strict enforcement of
the contemporaneity requirement reduces the risk of defective memory
to a negligible possibility; 89 as a practical matter, the immediacy of

It is submitted that Proposed Rule 803(1) is subject to the same criticism [as the
proposed recent perception exception], and to a greater degree by reason of the
fact that the requirement here is that the hearsay is admissible even though the
alleged declarant is available as a witness at the trial. Under the now stricken
[recent perception exception] the requirement of unavailability of the declarant
was made, thus giving at least some semblance of need for the admission of the
hearsay.
Id.
183. The House Judiciary Committee explained the rejection of the recent perception exception in this manner: 'The Committee eliminated this Rule as creating a new and unwarranted
hearsay exception of great potential breadth. The Committee did not believe that statements
of the type referred to bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify admissibility.
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 256 (1989).
184. Cf. Note, supranote 70, at 1061 (addressing the need for contemporaneity and spontaneity).
185. See id. at 1059-61, 1075.
186. United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1982).
187. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 438, at 488-90 n.77 (1980)
(citing United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785-86 (7th Cir. 1979) ("between several and 23
minutes"); United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678, 681-82 (5th Cir. 1979) ("within a few minutes");
Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co., 578 F.2d 422, 426 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("at least fifteen minutes
and possibly up to forty-five minutes after the accident")).
188. Id. § 439, at 181 (Supp. 1988) (citing United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 85-86
(8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981)).
189. Id. § 438, at 483 (1980).
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the statement 190 eradicates potential memory deficiencies. 19' In the
case of a present sense impression statement, the hearsay risk of
misrecollection is almost nonexistent.
When the statement is one of recent perception, however, the time
lapse can be much lengthier. The recent perception exception would
probably apply to statements made the day after the event in question.19 The greater time lapse increases the risk of memory impairment. 19e There is a difference in degree in the risk; and given the
rapid rate of forgetting documented by psychological researchers,'9
the difference is significant.
In summary, the text of Article VIII of the Rules, the accompanying Advisory Committee Notes, and the relevant passages from the
congressional hearings all point to the same conclusion: under Article
VIII, courts must scrutinize the memory factor in proffered hearsay
testimony much more closely than they did at common law. The congressional concern over the memory factor is evident in such provisions
as Rules 803(1)-(3), 803(5), and 804(a)(3). Courts certainly must attend
to the memory factor in applying those provisions of the statutory
scheme.
More broadly, however, sensitivity to the memory factor was a
recurring motif in the deliberations over the proposed hearsay exceptions. That overarching concern should not only guide courts in applying provisions such as Rule 803(5), which expressly direct the courts
to factor memory into their admissibility analyses; but it also should
infuse the courts' administration of hearsay provisions such as 803(6) 19,

190. Id. § 438, at 482 (1980).
191. United States v. Narisco, 446 F. Supp. 252, 285 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
192. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supr note 127, 804(b)(5)[04], at 804-199.
193. Note, supra note 70, at 1075.
194. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
195. Federal Rule 803(6) codifies the business entry exception:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:... (6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EvID. 803.
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and 803(8). 19 Those provisions codify the business entry'9 and official

record19 hearsay exceptions, respectively. Both provisions confer on
the trial judge discretion to determine whether the hearsay evidence
is sufficiently reliable to be admissible.'9 The Advisory Committee
and Congress considered the memory factor to be an important index
to the reliability of hearsay testimony. Thus, trial judges should weigh
that factor in exercising their discretion under Article VIII. For example, they should consider whether the business entry2 or official record2ol was prepared in a timely fashion, minimizing the risk of misrecollection.
V.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS:
THE LESSON FORGOTTEN

Part III of this article noted that since the turn of the century,
psychologists have criticized the common law assumptions about memory. The preceding section of this article demonstrated that at long
last, when Congress passed Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evi-

196. Rule 803(8) embodies the official record hearsay exception:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: . . . (8) Public records and reports. Records, reports,
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting
forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant
to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding,
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government
in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant
to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EvID. 803(8).
197. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 304-14, at 870-87.
198. Id. §§ 315-20, at 888-98.
199. The first sentence of Rule 803(6) concludes with the clause, "unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness."
FED. R. EVID. 803(6). Rule 803(8) contains a similar clause. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8); see
also FED. R. EVID. 803(7) ('unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness").
200. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 186, § 446, at 661-62; Stewart, supra
note 15, at 24; see also United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(corporate memorandum was not prepared in a timely fashion), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984).
201. See In re Paducach Towing, Inc., 692 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Pa. 1980); Fraley v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
470 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D. Ohio 1979). The California Evidence Code explicitly requires that the
record be "made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event . . .." CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1280(b) (West 1989).
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dence in 1975,m the legal system responded constructively to the
criticism. Several provisions of Article VIII require courts to analyze
the risk of misrecollection. Other provisions mandate a discretionary
determination of the trustworthiness of proffered hearsay testimony.
Courts can and should consider the risk of deficient memory in making
that determination.
Two questions then naturally arise: Have the courts recognized
their new duty to be attentive to the memory factor in passing on
the admissibility of hearsay? Do the cases applying Article VIII exhibit
a heightened awareness of the hearsay risk of memory? Unfortunately,
in many cases, courts have been blind to this duty. In a number of
cases decided under the excited utterance, past recollection recorded,
and residual hearsay exceptions, courts have neglected their duty and
overlooked substantial memory risks.
A.

Excited Utterance Cases

United States v. Napier203 is illustrative. A grand jury indicted
Napier for interstate kidnapping in violation of the Lindbergh Act.
The alleged victim, Mrs. Caruso, had been kidnapped in Oregon and
transported to Washington, where she was found unconscious with
severe head injuries. Expert testimony indicated that she had suffered
such extreme brain damage that she was incapable of testifying at
trial. She was hospitalized for seven weeks after the assault, and
underwent two brain operations during that time.2 Approximately
one week after she returned home from the hospital, her sister showed
her a newspaper article about her case. The article contained a photograph of the defendant. 2° The sister testified that when Mrs. Caruso
looked at the photograph, her "immediate reaction was one of great
distress and horror and upset." According to her sister, Mrs. Caruso
"pointed to [the photograph] and she said very clearly, 'He killed me,
he killed me."' Over defense objection, the trial judge admitted the
sister's testimony about Mrs. Caruso's statement; the judge ruled that
the statement qualified as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2).m

202.
203.
204.
205.

Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926.
518 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975).
Id. at 317.
Id.

206. Id.
207.
208.

Id.
Id. at 317-18.
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Even if Napier were a common law case, it would be an extreme
decision on its facts. It is true that at common law there were no
hard-and-fast rules as to how long the declarant's state of nervous
excitement could last. However, in Napier, Mrs. Caruso made her
hearsay declaration roughly two months after the attack. In practice,
common law courts rarely admitted statements made that long after
the event under the excited utterance exception. 20

But Napier was not a common law case; it was decided under the

Federal Rules of Evidence. 210 The Napier decision was rendered in
mid-1975, shortly after the Rules took effect.21, Napier ignored the

mandate of Article VIII and forewent any analysis of the memory
factor. After a vague reference to unspecified evidence indicating that
Mrs. Caruso's memory was intact, the court analyzed the admissibility
of the evidence solely in terms of the sincerity factor. As the court
framed the issue, the question was whether viewing a photograph
could be a sufficiently startling event to induce nervous excitement
in Mrs. Caruso's mind. 21 2 The Ninth Circuit sustained the trial court's

admission of the testimony because "suddenly and unexpectedly confront[ing]" the photograph could produce enough excitement in her
'2 3
mind to "safeguard[ ] against reflection and fabrication.

The Napier court plainly missed the point. The facts raised grave
doubts about the quality of the declarant's memory, a factor the court
should have considered under Article VIII. As noted previously, observers are inclined to forget details about events with negative associations.214 The attack on Mrs. Caruso was a traumatic experience for

her, the very type of experience that can trigger the phenomenon of
repression.215 Further, a substantial amount of time elapsed between

209. See generally 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 187, § 438, at 490; id. §
439, at 505-07; Stewart, supra note 15, at 28; Comment, supra note 37, at 671-72 ("In most
cases in which excited utterances have been admitted, the time element involved has been less

than fifteen minutes ...."); Annot., Time Element as Affecting Admissibility of Statement or
Complaint Made by Victim of Sex Crime as Res Gestae, Spontaneous Exclamation,or Excited
Utterance, 89 A.L.R.3d 102, 113-14, 170-71 (1979) (time element as it affects res gestae in sex
crime cases); Annot., Time Element as Affecting Admissibility of Statements By Victim of Sex
Crimes as Res Gestae, 19 A.L.R.2d 579, 583, 603 (1951) ("Statements made a day or several
days or more after commission of the offense are generally regarded as not part of the res

gestae.").
210. Napier, 518 F.2d at 317-18.
211. Napier was rendered on June 13, 1975. The Federal Rules of Evidence took effect in
early 1975. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926.
212. Napier, 518 F.2d at 318.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
215. See id.
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the event and the hearsay declaration, an exceptional lapse even by
common law standards. Psychological research documents the rapid
rate at which memory fades. 216 Finally, the facts of the case strongly

imply external suggestion at the time of the hearsay statement. Mrs.
Caruso evidently realized that she was looking at a newspaper article
about her attack. As far as one can tell from reading the opinion, the
article contained a single photograph - the photograph of the defendant. In other contexts, courts repeatedly have remarked that presenting the victim with a single person in a showup 2 7 or a solitary photograph is inherently suggestive. 21 8 In Napier, these factors - the

traumatic event, the lengthy time lapse, and the implicit suggestions
made at the time of Mrs. Caruso's statement - accumulated to create
a serious memory risk. Yet the Napier court altogether ignored that
risk.
B.

Past Recollection Recorded Cases

Napier is not an isolated phenomenon. United States v. Patterson,21 9 decided in 1982, fits into the same pattern. In Patterson, the
defendant was indicted for receiving stolen property and transporting
stolen property in interstate commerce. The property in question consisted of three forklifts stolen from different California companies.
One of the witnesses at the grand jury hearing was James McKay,
the defendant's nephew. Before the grand jury hearing, the prosecution granted McKay immunity.220 This was in all probability a limited
grant of use and derivative use immunity,21 protecting McKay only

216. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
217. Sanchell v. Parratt, 530 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1976); Jenkins v. Warrington, 530 F. Supp.
121 (D. Mont. 1982), affd, 714 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1983); Wadley v. State, 634 S.W.2d 658 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1982); Durrough v. State, 672 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
218. Bloodworth v. Hopper, 539 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Kimbrough,
528 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976); Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1975); Wicks v. Lockhart,
569 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Ark. 1983). Some courts have gone so far as to condemn the use of
showups, demanding that police agencies abandon the practice. See, e.g., Wadley, 634 S.W.2d
at 658; Durrough, 672 S.W.2d at 860.
219. 678 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1982).
220. Id. at 777.
221. There are two types of immunity: the broader transactional immunity, and limited use
and derivative use immunity. E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER,
COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1733, at 476-77 (1987) [hereinafter E. IMWINKELRIED
& P. GIANNELLI]. Transactional immunity protects the grantee from any prosecution for the
immunized acts. In contrast, use and derivative use immunity protects the grantee only from
the use of the compelled disclosure as testimony against the grantee at a trial or as an investigative lead. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Supreme Court held that use
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from the testimonial or investigative use of his compelled testimony,
rather than from any prosecution for his crimes. McKay testified before
the grand jury that he had had an earlier conversation with the defendant about several forklifts in the defendant's possession. McKay also
testified that in the conversation, the defendant told him that the
forklifts came from California and that they were stolen. At least ten
months elapsed between the alleged conversation and McKay's grand
jury testimony.222
Approximately four months later at trial, McKay professed that
he could not remember any conversation with the defendant.223 After
attempting unsuccessfully to refresh McKay's memory with the transcript of his grand jury testimony,11 the prosecutor offered the transcript as substantive evidence under Rule 803(5) governing the past
recollection recorded doctrine.229 The trial judge admitted the transcript over defense objection.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit sustained the trial judge's decision;2
the court relied in part on the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Senak.m The Pattersoncourt acknowledged that Senak was
a "pre-Rules" case.
In Senak, the three-year time lapse between
the event and the statement was even greater than in Patterson.m
After discussing Senak, the Pattersoncourt emphasized that the trial
judge has broad discretion in determining the freshness of the declarant's memory.23 1 The extent of the court's factual analysis was limited
to pointing to McKay's trial testimony that he remembered the conversation at the time of the grand jury hearing.2 Based on that analysis,
the court declared that 'it was well within the discretion of the trial
judge" to rule that McKay's memory was fresh at the time of the

and derivative use immunity is sufficient to supplant the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The common, contemporary practice is to grant only use and derivative use
immunity. E. IMWINKELRIED & P. GIANNELLI, supra, § 1733, at 478.
222. Patterson, 678 F.2d at 779.
223. Id. at 777.
224.

225.
226.
227.
228.
425 U.S.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See FED. R. EVID. 612.

Patterson, 678 F.2d at 777.
Id.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 779 (citing United States v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
907 (1976)).
Id.
Senak, 527 F.2d at 136.
Patterson, 678 F.2d at 779.
Id.
Id.
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grand jury hearing. In concluding, the court stated that even if the
ruling was erroneous, the error was harmless.2 4
Like Napier, the Patterson decision is dubious. When Patterson
was decided, one commentator, Professor Schmertz, voiced disagreement with the decision.2 In particular, he found fault with the court's
analysis of the memory factor:
[I]t would seem preferable to rely upon a more objective
test of memory freshness based on accepted psychological
findings on the general patterns of human forgetting rather
than rely to a large degree on the credibility of the witness
as to the state of his memory four months before as to a
conversation ten months before that.236

Professor Schmertz's criticism of Pattersonis well-taken. One flaw in
the opinion is the court's assumption that pre-Rules cases are still
good law on the question of freshness of memory. The court cited
Senak and, in effect, argued that if a three-year time lapse was acceptable in Senak, a ten-month lapse should be acceptable in Patterson.
That argument is unsound. As the preceding section of this article
demonstrates, Article VIII of the Rules requires courts to adopt a
more critical attitude toward the memory factor than they had at
common law. When Congress passed on the proposed Rules, it rejected
the exception for recent perception declarations. 2 7 That exception
probably would have permitted the admission only of statements made
within a few days after the perceived event.m Yet Congress concluded
that the statements qualifying under that exception posed unacceptably high hearsay risks, notably memory impairment.23 Congress's decision to reject the recent perception exception raises doubts about
the admissibility of hearsay statements made any appreciable length
of time after the event.20 The Patterson court thus erred in treating
Senak as apposite authority under the Rules.
Pattersoncompounded its error with a superficial analysis of the
facts. The court's entire analysis consisted of noting McKay's trial
testimony that he recalled the conversation at the time of the grand

234.
235.
236.

Id. at 780.
7 FED. RULES EVID. NEWS 82-95 (1982).

Id.

237. 4 J.
238.
239.
240.

WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 127, 804(b)(5)[04], at 804-202.
Id. 804(b)(5)[04J, at 804-199.
See Note, supra note 70, at 1075.
Id.; see also Robinson v. Shapiro, 646 F.2d 734, 742 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981).
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jury hearing. Even assuming McKay's sincerity and the truthfulness
of his trial testimony, the court misunderstood the memory problem.
By their very nature, misrecollection errors are unintentional; the
declarant honestly but mistakenly believes that his or her memory is
accurate. The court should not accept the declarant's profession of
accurate memory at face value. Rather, it is incumbent upon the court
to engage in a particularized analysis of the psychological factors affecting the accuracy of memory.
In Patterson, those factors make the quality of the declarant's
memory questionable. Between the alleged conversation and the grand
jury testimony about the conversation, several factors worked to lower
the quality of the memory. As in Napier, a considerable amount of
time elapsed. Moreover, bias came into play. McKay likely had only
use and derivative use immunity.2 1 If so, he was still vulnerable to
the possibility of prosecution for his involvement in the crimes. Hence
he had a potent motivation to curry the prosecution's favor; he may
have realized that if his grand jury testimony disappointed the prosecutor, the prosecutor might become angry enough to conduct the
investigation needed to unearth independent evidence of McKay's
guilt.242 Bias can induce witnesses to remember what they wish had
happened rather than what actually happened. 24 Lastly, again as in
Napier, the danger of suggestion was present at the time of the
hearsay statement. In the typical grand jury hearing, a prosecutor
interrogates the witnesses. Because the prosecutor is an authority
figure, there is a risk that witnesses will follow any suggestive leads
in the prosecutor's questions. In Patterson,that risk was abnormally
high. The prosecutor's role at the hearing enhanced the danger created
by McKay's bias. During McKay's appearance before the grand jury,
the prosecutor would be a constant reminder to McKay of his immunity
and the need to cooperate with the prosecution.
Unfortunately, Pattersondoes not stand alone. Other past recollection recorded cases slight the memory factor as well. In United States
v. Williams,2" a prosecution witness gave a written statement to a
secret service agent. Like McKay's testimony in Patterson,the written
statement described a conversation between the witness and the defen-

See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
Cf. E. IMWINKELRIED & P. GIANNELLI, supra note 221, § 1734, at 478-81.
243. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
244. 571 F.2d 344 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 841 (1978). Williams is briefly mentioned
in 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 187, § 445, at 639 n.59.
241.

242.
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dant. The alleged conversation occurred "approximately six months"
before the witness signed the statement.2 5 As in Patterson, at trial
the witness acknowledged making the hearsay statement.2 6 The witness's trial testimony, however, contradicted some of the passages in
the earlier written statement.2 7 The witness added that before he
gave the agent the statement, the agent had threatened him with
prosecution.m Nevertheless, the prosecutor offered the statement into
evidence as past recollection recorded under Rule 803(5). The defense
objected, but the trial judge overruled the objection.2 9 Citing the
witness's acknowledgment of the statement, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's ruling. °
The Williams court's reasoning was strikingly similar to that in
Patterson. Like Patterson, the Williams court cited Senak, a preRules decision, as authority.2 1 The opinion reflects no appreciation
that the Rules place greater stress on the memory factor than did
common law decisions such as Senak. The court's factual analysis of
the memory issue was as superficial as that in Patterson. The trial
judge admitted the statement in the face of a half-year gap between
the event and the hearsay statement. Because the person who solicited
the statement was an authority figure, a secret service agent, the
risk of suggestion was present. According to the declarant's own trial
testimony, the risk was more than theoretical; the declarant himself
testified that the agent accused the declarant of criminal wrongdoing
before requesting the declarant's "cooperation."' 2 Although the substantial memory risks deserved extended analysis, the court made
short shrift of the memory issue.
C.

Residual Hearsay Exception Cases

Neglect of the memory factor is not confined to the cases decided
under the excited utterance and past recollection hearsay exceptions,
but has spilled over into the case law applying the residual hearsay
exceptions. After a heated debate,2- Congress decided to include re-

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Williams, 571 F.2d at 348.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 347-48.
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id. at 350.

251.

Id. at 349.

252. Id. at 346.
253. See generally Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the
FederalRules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239, 240 (1978) (noting congressional debate
over whether to include residual exceptions).
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sidual exceptions at the end of Rules 8032' and 804.2 Rule 804(b)(5)
provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:... (5)... A statement
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.2
During the first few years after passage of the Federal Rules, courts

57
applied the residual exceptions cautiously and rarely invoked them.2

In recent years, however, courts have interpreted the residual exceptions more expansively.ns
Courts have been especially willing to use Rule 804(b)(5) as a basis
for admitting the grand jury testimony of declarants who are unavailable at trial.2 9 Although the Patterson court resorted to the past
recollection recorded doctrine to justify admitting grand jury testimony, a federal court today is more likely to employ the residual
exceptions as the basis for introducing the testimony. Professor
Jonakait has thoroughly studied this use of Rule 804(b)(5)'s residual
exception.26 His study reveals that as in the case of the excited utterance and past recollection recorded exceptions, the cases applying the
residual exceptions often slight the memory factor.'
United States v. Garner,es a 1978 decision by the Fourth Circuit,
is one of the seminal cases applying the residual exception to grand

254. FED. R. EvID. 803(24).
255. FED. R. EvD. 804(b)(5).
256. Id.
257. E. IMWINKELRIED &P. GIANNELLI, supranote 221, §1230, at 326, § 1313, at 347.
258. Id.
259. Id. § 1313, at 347; see Annot., Admissibility of Testimony Before Grand Jury of
UnavailableWitness Under Rule 804(b)(5), FederalRules of Evidence, ProvidingforAdmission
of Hearsay Statement not Covered by Any Specific Exception but Having Equivalent CircumstantialGuarantees of Trustworthiness, 50 A.L.R. Fed. 848 (1980).
260. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual Hearsay Exceptions,
CircumstantialGuaranteesof Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 431 (1986).
261. Id. at 450-51.
262. 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).
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jury testimony. Garner and his codefendants were charged with importing heroin from Europe. At trial, some of the prosecution's most
crucial evidence was the grand jury testimony of Warren Robinson.
At the grand jury hearing, Robinson testified that the defendants
recruited him to help in their heroin importation scheme and that he
accompanied them on several overseas trips to carry out the scheme.20
After the overseas trips but before his grand jury appearance,
Robinson was incarcerated264 and indicted for other offenses.26 Facing
the prospect of "very heavy penalties," he entered a plea agreement.
The agreement required him to testify against the defendants before
the grand jury. Robinson fulfilled that requirement at a grand jury
hearing, which evidently occurred "more than a year" after the overseas trips.2 7 After the hearing and before the defendants' trial, how-

ever, Robinson indicated his reluctance to testify at trial. Despite his
lawyer's advice, Robinson persisted in his refusal to testify. He remained uncooperative even though the court granted him use immunity
2
and threatened him with contempt. 6

At trial, Robinson answered only a few of the questions put to
him. One of the things he did testify to was that "his grand jury
testimony was inaccurate. ' ' 269 In addition to attempting to elicit Robin-

son's live testimony, the prosecution offered documentary evidence of
airline tickets, customs declarations, passport endorsements, and hotel
registrations. 270 The documentary evidence contradicted portions of
Robinson's grand jury testimony.271 Undaunted, the prosecutor offered
the grand testimony transcript as evidence under Rule 804(b)(5). The
trial judge accepted the offer, 272 and over a dissent,m the Fourth
Circuit sustained the admission of the transcript. 274
The appellate court reasoned that admission was proper because
ample corroboration existed for Robinson's grand jury testimony. One
source of corroboration was the trial testimony of one Ms. McKee, 27r
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whose motivation to cooperate with the prosecution is unclear. 6 She
admitted her participation in criminal acts,m and may have struck a
deal with the prosecution before trial. 8 In any event, she testified
at trial that she had accompanied Robinson and Garner on one of the
overseas trips.m Her trial testimony described events that occurred
more than a year earlier.m After mentioning McKee's testimony, the
court conceded that Robinson's grand jury testimony and the prosecution's documentary evidence clashed.2 1 Nonetheless, the court dismissed the importance of the discrepancy. By way of explanation, the
court stated that "[tiestifying from his recollection more than a year
later, Robinson may have been confused about [the details]."2
The Garner opinion is cast in the same mold as Napier and Patterson. All three depreciate the importance of the memory factor in
evaluating the reliability of hearsay testimony. The memory factor in
Robinson's grand jury appearance was suspect on several grounds.
The most obvious ground was the significant time lapse between
Robinson's grand jury appearance and the events he described. However, there were several other reasons to be skeptical of the trustworthiness of his grand jury testimony. As in Patterson, the bias factor
operated in the interim between the events and the grand jury hearing;
like McKay, Robinson entered an agreement with the prosecutor.
Moreover, a risk of suggestion existed at the hearing itself, since a

prosecutorial agent undoubtedly elicited Robinson's testimony. Worse
still, the prosecution's documentary evidence and Robinson's trial testimony contradicted several statements in his grand jury testimony.
The memory factor in McKee's corroborating testimony was suspect
for some of the same reasons: possible bias and a lengthy time gap.2
In discounting the conflicts between the documentary evidence and
Robinson's grand jury testimony, the Garner court indicated that because he was testifying about events which had occurred more than
a year earlier,2 Robinson's misrecollection was understandable. Inexplicably, the court ignored that McKee's corroborating testimony

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Jonakait, supra note 260, at 450.
Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144.
Jonakait, supra note 260, at 450.
Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144.
Jonakait, supra note 260, at 450.
Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144-45.
Id. at 1145.
Jonakait, supra note 260, at 450.
Garner, 574 F.2d at 1145.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

was vulnerable to the same memory deficiency. The facts in Garner
created a tremendous danger of faulty memory.2
Professor Jonakait is properly critical of the Garner court's failure
to appreciate the memory flaws in Robinson's grand jury testimony.2
Moreover, he recognizes a growing trend to admit unavailable declarants' grand jury testimony even when the testimony presents significant memory risks.m He perceives the case law as moving toward
the routine admission of grand jury testimony of unavailable declarants.m
Jonakait finds this trend troublesome. He argues that admitting
grand jury testimony that presents such risks violates the legislative
intent of Article VIII.2 ° As evidence of the legislative intent, he points
to Congress's rejection of the proposed hearsay exception for statements of recent perception.2 1 Although he rests his case against the
routine admission of grand jury testimony primarily on the sincerity
factor in hearsay analysis,2 the memory factor greatly strengthens
his case. By its terms, Rule 804(b)(5) instructs courts to admit hearsay
under the residual exception only when the hearsay has guarantees
of trustworthiness "equivalent" to those underlying the specifically
enumerated hearsay exceptions.2 3 The rule provides that courts may
invoke the residual exception only if doing so would serve "the general
purposes of these rules ..

.

."2

The preceding section of this article

demonstrated that Article VIII places greater stress on the memory
factor. Accordingly, it does not serve "thegeneral purposes" of Article
VIII to admit testimony posing major memory risks. Quite to the
contrary, doing so violates the mandate of Article VIII that courts
be more sensitive to the memory factor.
VI.

CONCLUSION

On the one hand, this article does not call for the formulation of
fixed, arbitrary rules for determining which time lapses between per-

285. Jonakait, supra note 260, at 451-52.
286. See id. at 452.
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ception and attempted recollection are acceptable.2 5 As part II of this
article points out, one cause of the early neglect of the memory factor
in hearsay analysis was the drastically oversimplified common law
assumptions about the operation of human memory. The memory function is much more complex than the common law assumed,2 6 and that
complexity precludes developing hard-and-fast rules about the length
of the memory interval. The law stands to gain nothing by replacing
one set of simplistic assumptions with an equally arbitrary set.
On the other hand, it is desirable and now legislatively mandated
that the courts focus more intensely on the memory factor in hearsay
analyses. Modern psychology has provided important insights into the
memory function. Courts can improve the quality of their hearsay
analysis by capitalizing on those insights. More to the point, not only
should they take advantage of those insights, but Article VIII of the
Federal Rules requires them to do so. The history of Article VIII its text, the Advisory Committee notes, and the relevant congressional
materials - evidences concern about the memory factor. Courts should
bear that concern in mind when they apply the provisions of Article
VIII, such as Rule 803(5), the past recollection recorded exception,
expressly referring to the memory factor. The same concern should
guide the courts' exercise of discretion that provisions such as Rule
803(8), the official record exception, confer on them.
Unfortunately, the judicial response to the mandate of Article VIII
has been disappointing. Like their common law predecessors, courts
construing Article VIII have tended to focus on the sincerity factor
to the neglect of the more important memory factor. As the last
section of this article demonstrates, that neglect is evident in a number
of cases decided under the excited utterance, past recollection recorded, and residual exception doctrines. Some commentators have
charged that the same neglect is now infecting the courts' administration of the present sense impression exception.m In all too many cases
decided under the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts have been content
with the same superficial analysis of the memory factor that pervaded
the common law. At least when a significant memory interval is
coupled with other psychological factors tending to cause misrecollec-

295. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 187, § 445, at 639 ("Wooden rules
of thumb - such as the memory remains fresh for a few weeks, but that the passage of several
years precludes a decision that memory is still fresh - are not helpful.").
296. Kubie, supra note 19, at 61.
297. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 131, at 670.
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tion, courts should engage in a careful, in-depth evaluation of the
memory risks posed by proffered hearsay testimony. In 1952, one of
the great reformers of American evidence law, Dean Mason Ladd,
criticized the overemphasis of the common law on the sincerity factor. 29 He counseled the courts that the impressive evidence of the

importance of the memory factor "requires [more] thought upon the
hearsay we admit." Almost four decades later, his counsel is still
wise.
298.
299.

Ladd, supra note 32, at 280-81, 286.
Id. at 288.
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